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Three Kinds of Normative Behaviour:
Minimal Requirements for Feedback Models
Abstract
We present an analysis for modelling social norms. In social psychol-
ogy three different normative behaviours have been identified: obedi-
ence, conformity and compliance. We show that this triad is a use-
ful conceptualisation of normative behaviour and that current models
only ever deal with conformity and obedience two, neglecting com-
pliance. We argue that this is a result from modelling having so far
focussed too much on agent behaviour rather than agent knowledge
and that cognitive models of normative behaviour are needed to cap-
ture this third and arguably most interesting normative behaviour.
Introduction
The conundrum of social norms has been the backbone of sociological enquiry
from the very start. Social order exists without any central planning or
decentralised negotiation, contract or agreement. The conceptualisation of
social facts dominated the analysis for the better part of the last century
(from Durkheimian origins to the structuralism of the 1960s). Structuralism
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was later rejected as being too deterministic, not leaving enough agency
for individuals (see for example critiques by Bourdieu and more recently
Coleman (1990)). But with a starting point of individuals alone it is hard
to explain the phenomenon of social order. This is commonly known as the
structure-agency problem of social norms (e.g. see inter alia Ritzer (2007),
Giddens (1993) and Goffman (1959)).
Different types of social norms can easily be distinguished but it is hard
to give a fully fledged typology (Verhagen (2007)). There are coordination
norms, like driving on the left or right, there are fashion norms, like wearing
hats or ties, there are moral norms concerning e.g. abortion rights. In terms
of modelling there is an array of models of norms, from game theoretic models
conceptualising norms via cooperation and defection (Axelrod (1984)) over
models transmitting norms via imitation mechanisms (e.g. Flentge et al.
(2001), Gatherer (2002), Epstein (2000)) to models analyising the function of
norms (Conte and Castelfranci (1995)). We can categorise norms by content,
transmission mechanism, origin, function etc. but it is likely that we will fail
like many other categorisations before (Morris (1956)). The reason is that
it is not the content of the norm itself that is interesting but how and why
people adhere to a norm and for that it does not matter whether it is wearing
a hat to a wedding of protesting against an abortion clinic.
Rather than attempting a new typology or categorisation of norms we
use a tripartition of normative behaviour from social psychology. There are
three essential ways of people adhering to norms: conformity, obedience and
compliance. Using these three types of adherence to norms we sort exist-
ing models of normative behaviour. We show that compliance has not been
captured in any models so far and argue that it is the most interesting adher-
ence type as it alone displays a feature unique to humans: context sensitive
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deliberation about values.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1 we give a
definition of normative behaviour. In Section 2 we explain conformity, obedi-
ence and compliance from a social psychology point of view. We particularly
focus on compliance, arguing that it is the mechanism of behaviour unique
to humans. In Section 3 we sort a set of major models of normative be-
haviour into the categories established in Section 2. In Section 4 we discuss
some minimal cognitive requirements models of normative behaviour have to
incorporate if they want to tackle compliance. We conclude in Section 5.
1 Defining Normative Behaviour
In order to get a handle on normative behaviour we need to define in some
way what we mean by it and how it contrasts with other behaviour. Just
like with the typology of social norms, there are many different definitions
in the literature on what constitutes normative behaviour. We discussed
different origins and definitions of agent-based models of norms research in
Xenitidou and Elsenbroich (2010). These different origins put a different
emphases on aspects of social norms. For example, game theory stresses the
punishment aspect for deviance whilst social physics stresses the imitation
aspect of norms (cf. Axelrod (1984), Epstein (2000)). Recent approaches
(Andrighetto et al. (2007), Lorscheid and Troitzsch (2009), Lotzmann and
Mo¨hring (2009b)) have developed a new angle on normative behaviour which
lies somewhere between the punishment and an imitation approach. Here
normative behaviour is defined as behaviour resulting from norm invocation,
usually implemented in the form of invocation messages which carry the
notions of social pressure, but without direct punishment, and the notion of
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assimilating to a social surrounding without blind or unthinking imitation.
Although we like this definition we think it is too narrow to capture the
complicated range of normative behaviour that exists in human society. We
discuss this range in Section 2 and it will be clear that a classification of
behaviour as normative via norm invocation messages will not cover the full
range.
We want to adopt a definition that is both wide and narrow in some
respects, to capture the intuitive range of normative behaviour as well as
the range identified in other scientific fields. We bring context and deliber-
ation into the definition, focus on the interconnection between decision and
behaviour and juxtapose normative behaviour to behaviour resulting from
personal values. For this discussion we assume that a distinction between
behaviour resulting from social influence and behaviour independent of so-
cial influence can be made.
Definition 1.1 (Normative Decision) A decision is a normative decision
if it is brought about by (direct or indirect) social influence.
This means a decision is normative if there is social influence (pressure, in-
vocation, threat of punishment, etc.) on the agent and if the agent makes
the decision in favour of the social demand.
Definition 1.2 (Normative Behaviour) A behaviour is normative if and
only if it results from a normative decision.
This definition is an “if and only if” meaning that a) all behaviours result-
ing from normative decisions are normative behaviours and that b) only be-
haviours resulting from normative decisions are normative behaviours. State-
ment a) is relatively uncontroversial. If an agent makes a normative decision
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as in Definition 1.1, the resulting behaviour will be normative. b) how-
ever excludes from normative behaviour any behaviours resulting not from
choice/not involving decision at all. Automatic responses are thus excluded
and it can be argued that our definition excludes a vast set of behaviours
that should be classified as normative, namely automatic behaviours result-
ing from internalised norms. On the one hand this means that we see all
behaviour resulting from social influence as normative behaviour, which is
a wide definition. On the other hand it means that we exclude from our
definition all behaviour that is non-deliberative, i.e. automatic behaviour,
internalised behaviour etc. which is rather narrow. This is a controversial
step as internatlisation is seen as the hallmark of normative behaviour in
much of the literature (see Neumann (2009) and references therein). We feel
justified to exclude it from our definition nonetheless as we are concerned
with deliberative normative behaviour. Once a social norm has become in-
ternalised the agent no longer makes a decision about its behaviour. For
us, there are three kinds of behaviour: value-led, normative and automatic
behaviour; this article is concerned with the first two and excludes the third.
Internalisation is the reason for a transition of a behaviour from delibera-
tive normative behaviour to automatic behaviour. Although mechanisms of
norm internalisation are an important research topic (see the EmiL Project
for great advances on this front1) it is not our concern in this paper and once
a norm has been internalised, the behavioural output becomes uniform (the
automatic response) until the next behavioural decision at which point our
definitions will apply again.
Let us see with some examples what is covered by our definition. First
1http://emil.istc.cnr.it/
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of all, some deviant behaviour is included in our definition of normative
behaviour. A teenager rebelling against a set of social norms might make
this decision due to social influence, for example if she rebells simply to rebell
against her parents. Here the parents are something to react against. Also,
deviant behaviour with respect to a majority norm can easily be normative
behaviour with respect to a minority norm, i.e. the teenager rebelling due to
her peer-group. Here the peer group is something to behave in accordance
with. Depending on the directedness of the decision, the teenager’s behaviour
may be deemed normative or deviant. This means, whether behaviour is seen
as deviant or normative is contextual, dependent on the external evaluation.
Secondly, one and the same behaviour can be normative or non-normative.
Wearing a hat to a wedding because it is “the done thing” and wearing
a hat to a wedding because one just loves hats, or protesting against an
abortion clinic because many people are demonstrating against it or because
of a deeply held aversion to abortion result in the same behaviours but have
different motivations, one normative the other based on individual values and
tastes.
Some behaviours that might look like social influence need to be excluded.
For example if someone is told about a post at a university by a friend and
decides to apply. The decision to apply could not have been made without the
friend’s input meaning that there was some social aspect to the application
in the sense that information was received in the context of a relationship.
In itself this scenario does not constitute social influence as all the friend
did was to pass on information. However, if the decision to apply for the
job was brought about because the friend would be annoyed if the person
did not apply and, therefore, treated applying for the post as normative (e.g.
because it was a tailor-made internal post, or the information receiving friend
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had been complaining he has been unemployed for a long time), it would be
an instance of normative behaviour according to Definitions 1.1 and 1.2.2
Another scenario is that of Amy asking Ben to jump off a bridge. If Ben
jumps it is a case of behaviour brought about by social influence, but is it
normative? According to Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 it is normative behaviour.
What if Amy’s request was a joke? If Ben jumps it will still be normative
behaviour. If Ben does not jump without recognising that Amy’s request
was a joke Ben might behave according to his own values (such as survival).
If Ben recognises that Amy is joking and does not jump we could either
interpret his behaviour as normative in the sense that he understands that
Amy does not want him to jump or that no decision has to be made in the
first place as jumping is not considered an action alternative (i.e. it is not
normative behaviour as there is no specific behaviour to be analysed).3
For the last two scenarios a classification as normative behaviour might
seem counterintuitive. The reason for this is that they do not display some-
thing that is usually seen as an important feature of normative behaviour: be-
ing a behavioural regularity in a population. Although an important macro-
aspect of normative behaviour it cannot work as a definition of normative
behaviour. The problem is essentially a limit problem. To be a behavioural
regularity in a population we need to define what it means to be a regu-
larity and what is a relevant population. How often does a behaviour have
to be repeated in order to be a regularity? And how many people make
a population? In the limit the first question might be answered by saying
that a behaviour has to be displayed at least twice, i.e. one repetition for it
to make a regularity (any other number would be arbitrary). However, we
2Thanks to an anonymous referee for this scenario.
3Thanks for this scenario to an anonymous referee.
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would not describe a behaviour repeated once as a behavioural regularity.
Similarly with the population size. If we take a whole population (a ‘nation’,
an ‘ethnicity’, a ‘culture’) we will not find a single behaviour displayed by
everyone. We thus have to divide the population up. Further we cannot take
population majorities as indicative of normative behaviour as we need to do
justice to minority norms. In the limit a population could be defined as two
people. We end up with a behavioural regularity in a population as ‘the
same (similar?) behaviour executed twice or by two people’ which is just as
counterintuitive as our definition above appears to be.
These two limit problems are less of a problem when wanting to identify
normative behaviour, we look at some population and look for some regulari-
ties, i.e. we carve the population up into sub-populations that display similar
behaviour types (although even this categorisation needs plenty to back-
ground knowledge to rightly group behaviours). Thus, being a behavioural
regularity in a population is a useful description of normative behaviour but
not a definition.
Finally, not all behavioural regularities in a population are normative.
In the UK, the Pharmacy “Boots” gives away free nappy changing bags to
members of its Parenting Club. As a result, every second pram on the road
is adorned by the same grey and black bag. This is a behavioural regularity
but it’s origin can hardly be called normative.
We think that a pure macro-definition of normative behaviour as ‘a be-
havioural regularity in a population’ is thus untenable.4 Instead of the be-
havioural regularity aspect we focus on how agents adhere to norms, i.e.
4Incidentally, the definition used in ‘EmiL’ where normative behaviour is defined as be-
haviour coming about by norm invocation does not pay heed to the behavioural regularity
definition.
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whether they conform, obey or comply which means the focus is on the in-
dividual agent with the population regularity as an emergent phenomenon,
i.e. if enough people ask their friends to jump off bridges and they do so, the
result is a social norm of bridge jumping.
In the following section we discuss the distinction between three kinds of
normative behaviour from social psychology to give a theoretical embedding
of our definitions.
2 Social Psychology
Social psychology is a theoretically rich and varied social science discipline
and any given categorisation of norms will be severely contested by respec-
tive opponents. Nonetheless, the categorisation of normative behaviour into
conformity, obedience and compliance has a relatively wide reach within the
theoretical landscape (see inter alia Xenitidou and Elsenbroich (2010), Fran-
zoi (2000), Myers (2002), Hewstone et al. (2008)). The categorisation is based
on the conclusions of studies in experimental social psychology which dealt
with social norms focusing on the ways in which individuals influence one
another in group situations (Sherif (1936); Asch (1952); Milgram (1974)).
Henceforth, conformity, obedience and compliance have been described as
the behavioural consequences of social influence.
The first way of norm adherence is conformity. An agent conforms if it
simply follows the behaviour of other agents. An agent can conform to a
majority or a subgroup of the population. We will drive on the left hand
side of the road when in Great Britain but on the right on the European
continent. We might wear bumbags and socks when on holiday in Italy just
like other tourists or wear sunglasses and black like the Italians do. Both
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mean we conform to a subset of the population.
Conformity just means an agent has some behaviour that it will change
and adapt to the behaviour prevalent in a group (often but not necessarily
the majority of the population) (see Asch (1952)). The adoption of the norm
is complete once the agent becomes aware of the group behaviour meaning
that nothing specific to the individual agent needs to be carried over to
the post-norm adoption state. The notion of conformity can be linked to
structuralism as it shows the way social structure influences an individual’s
behaviour. The problem of structuralism is that it leaves no room for the
individual, making agents nothing but social puppets, normalised through
imitation and, thus, thoughtless (on automatic or thoughtless conformity see
Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003); Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001)).
Seeing conformity as “unthinking” adherence to a socially demanded be-
haviour seems to make it not covered by our definition. Although once the
behaviour is adopted the agent conforms unthinkingly, there is usually a point
at which an agent chooses to conform or not. If there is such a choice-point,
and the agent changes its behaviour to conform with normative demands,
the behaviour will result from a normative choice and thus be normative
behaviour. Our definition does not apply to cases where there is no choice
point.
The crucial distinction that we thus aim to make is between making a
decision according to individual values and a decision according to (direct
or indirect) social influence. We are aware that this sharp demarcation is
potentially problematic. We want to make the demarcation nonetheless as
it will help us to clarify what is missing from agent-based modelling of nor-
mative behaviour. We loose out on some aspects of normative behaviour
this way, like internalisation etc. but we think that in terms of modelling
10
the interesting aspect of normative behaviour is how agents change their be-
haviour rather than how they keep behaving in one way thus making the
choice-points crucial rather than the internalisation.
The second way of norm adherence is obedience. An agent obeys a norm
if adherence to a norm result from an authority enforcing the norm, e.g. by
punishment. The punishment can be applied by a small group or even a
single person with authority, i.e. the police or a father. Punishment can also
be applied by the agent’s community, in the form of ostracism for example.
We will not jump a red light in the car because we are afraid of being caught
and fined by the police.
Like conformity, obedience only demands the agent to make a binary
choice. If the external pressure becomes too big the agent will change its
behaviour and obey the norm. The agent needs to understand the cost
of defying a norm, i.e. the possibility and severity of punishment. Nothing
changes in the agent between the pre-norm adoption and post-norm adoption
state (see Milgram (1974) and Adorno et al. (1950)). Norm adherence is fully
determined externally. Analyses of norms using the mechanism of obedience
are theories based on a Hobbesian conception of society constraining the
individual, such as Rational Choice theory and game theory (e.g. Coleman
(1990), Bicchieri (2006)). These theories, relying on individualism have been
accused of not taking the social influence on agents seriously.
One might think that obedience is simply a case of self interest, covered
by any theory of cost benefit analysis.5 Although the decision to act in a
certain way is reached by weighing up the cost and benefit of the punishment
versus the action, the case of obedience is a special subset of general cost-
5Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing at this potential problem.
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benefit analysis as the demand to act in a certain way is socially induced and
contains the notion of punishment which carries with it a notion of authority
and hierarchy not present in other cost-benefit analyses. So although we can
say that a case of obedience is a cost benefit analysis, not every cost benefit
analysis is obedience.
The third way of norm adherence is compliance. An agent complies with a
norm if it follows it whilst being able to consider other behaviours. To comply
contains the element of decision, to comply to something now but not later
or to comply to something superficially but not really. Often compliance is
associated with publicly acting in a certain way whilst retaining ones personal
values. We might comply with wearing a suit to work although we would
never wear formal clothes otherwise.
Compliance is a more complex form of norm adherence than conformity
and obedience. Conformity means the agent changes its behaviour contin-
uously, i.e. once conformity has occurred it does not go back to previous
behaviour. The new behaviour becomes the only behaviour the agent’s repar-
toire. Obedience is enforced behaviour in which the agent does not actually
change its desires but suppresses them due to threatened punishment. Once
the threat is removed the agent can go back to its “old ways”.
Whilst in conformity the change in the agent is complete and in obedi-
ence there is essentially no change at all, compliance contains the possibil-
ity of change in some instances given that there is some concession of the
individual to social influence and internal pressure whilst keeping their indi-
vidual ‘values/desires’ alive. Compliance is also the form of norm adherence
that is most genuinely human. Whilst animals display conformity behaviour
(flocking, ant societies, etc.) and obedience (dog training etc.) they do not
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display context dependent behaviour resulting from compliance. Compliance
demands representations of the world ‘given compliance’ and the world ‘with-
out compliance’ and behaviour choices and decisions sensitive to the context.
It also demands intentionality ; the agent decides whether to comply to a
norm or not intentionally. The interplay of these representations, the inten-
tionality and choices is where the interesting feedback between the individual
and society lies.
How do these three kinds of normative behaviour relate to our defini-
tions of normative decision and normative behaviour? Each one is about a
behaviour change but each one relates to a slightly different kind of social
influence and a different kind of information informs the agent’s decision.
To conform means to change ones behaviour to conform to a majority so-
cial norm. The decision is informed by a calculation of the number of the
agents displaying the behaviour and according adaptation. To obey means
to change ones behaviour in the face of possible punishment. This deci-
sion is informed by the calculation of utilities for the agent. Is the cost
of punishment higher than the benefit of sticking to my values? If this is
answered yes the agent will change its behaviour. To comply means to pri-
oritise public values over ones own values, i.e. make a normative decision,
but the information is neither simple popularity of the normative position
nor the threat of punishment. The information is about the behaviour itself
and social reasons for foregoing individual values. An agent might comply
because it assesses the particular behaviour as good or appropriate in a par-
ticular context; for example, because it has contractually bound itself to some
behaviour or it might comply because it wants to please someone else, a par-
ent/friend/spouse/child/employer. These considerations are rather different
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from those of conformity and obedience. Only in compliance we prioritise
public over individual values whereas in conformity we make a simple calcu-
lation of popularity and for obedience we calculate the benefit and cost of
an action for us, without any consideration of others. And only compliance
leaves the possibility of complying with a norm in one context and acting
according to ones own values in another.
However, all three are behaviour changes due to social influence meaning
that our definition captures all three kinds whereas other definitions capture
only one or maybe two aspects, see Xenitidou and Elsenbroich (2010).
3 Models of Normative Behaviour
In this section we use the above categorisation and relate it to existing agent-
based models of normative behaviour. We argue that historically agent-based
modelling has solely focussed on conformity and obedience. As a result,
agent-based models have not yet achieved their potential to model normative
behaviour.
Agent-based modelling has its origin in several disciplines of both the
natural and social sciences, e.g. game-theory, artificial intelligence, (social)
physics.6 Many agent-based models of normative behaviour take their start-
ing point in game theory building on the original work by Axelrod (1984,
1986). Here normative behaviour is modelled as a binary concept: the agent
has the two behaviour options to cooperate or defect. Cooperation, in this
account is normative behaviour. Agents are defined as utility maximising or
satisficing (Simon (1982)) using an agent specific utility function. The first
assumption of game theory is that cooperation is costly for the agent, more
6For an excellent classification of models see Neumann (2008).
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costly than defection. The model then tries to skew the utility function of the
agents towards cooperation, using severity of punishment and the likelihood
of being caught as the variables. The goal is to find the mechanisms that
let cooperation emerge from the presupposed selfish, defective behaviour of
agents. In Axelrod (1986), for example, a surprising outcome was that co-
operation does not emerge with simple punishment but that agents that do
not punish an observed defection of a norm need to also be punished. Only
with this meta-norm game the utility function be skewed enough to ensure
cooperation. Models resulting from game theory can be collectively classified
as models of obedience. All of them use the enforcement of sanctions (pun-
ishment) as the mechanism that makes people adhere to norms (cooperate).
There are variations on the theme of game theory. For example, other agents
might not directly punish defection but punishment might be exerted by loss
of reputation (Hales (2002)), loss of trust (Macy and Skvoretz (1998)) or
ostracism (de Pinninck et al. (2008)).
Another notable strand of agent-based models of normative behaviour
relies on imitation mechanisms. Norms are again characterised as binary
choices although there are less assumptions in these models concerning the
utility of either norm to an agent. Most of the time the two norms are
symmetric in value. Epstein (2000) for example gives a model of normative
behaviour in which people switch their behaviour depending on the agents
surrounding them. People want to ‘fit in’ in this model. In addition to
this he formalises the behaviour that people, when they do ‘fit in’, get lazy
and stop thinking about their behaviour. Thus conformity obviates the need
for thinking and agents check less agents around them on fitting in. Other
models of this kind are Flentge et al. (2001) and Gatherer (2002). These
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models use memes7 and imitation mechanisms for the spread of normative
behaviour among agents. Models using imitation are conformity models of
normative behaviour. An agent gives up its behaviour completely if a large
enough number of the population displays a different behaviour; behaviour
change is due to direct or indirect majority or group pressure.
We think that most agent-based models of normative behaviour fit into
these two categories. Exceptions from the classic models of normative be-
haviour are Conte and Castelfranci (1995) and Castelfranchi et al. (1998).
These models are of a different kind as they assess the function of norms for
the wellbeing of the society rather than adherence to norms.
We mentioned above that agent-based models to date have only captured
obedience and conformity. We think the reason for this is that both concepts
can be modelled using simple calculation, as has been described above in
the Epstein model for conformity and the Axelrod model for obedience. To
model compliance we need deliberation about personal and public values. In
the next section we present what we see as the first steps towards models of
norm compliance.
4 Compliance Models
Let us come back to compliance defined as public conformity whilst keeping
personal values. This implies two levels of conceptualisation, a private and a
public one. The agent needs to a) have a belief base of its personal attitudes,
values and beliefs about the world. It b) needs to have a representation
of the external world including the understanding of normative rules and
7The concept of meme goes back to Dawkins (1976) and is the unit of selection in
cultural selection just like the gene in natural selection.
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judgements. And finally c) it needs a way of combining those two, i.e. of
judging, choosing, integrating and juxtaposing the internal and external.
So far we have established that compliance is not covered as a normative
behaviour in agent-based modelling and that it is arguably the most inter-
esting as it is uniquely human. The explanation for this omission is simple:
conformity and obedience fit into the paradigm of agent-based modelling of
focussing on behaviour (rather than cognition). For conformity it is suffi-
cient to have a rule that a behaviour is changed if a different behaviour is
displayed in a certain number of other agents (threshold) in a certain en-
vironment (neighbours, whole population etc.). The agent needs a factual
representation of the outside world to know when to change behaviour but it
needs no normative knowledge whatsoever. For obedience the behaviour of
an agent changes when a behaviour is “punished”. This punishment needs
a value/utility assignment to the behaviour and a value/utility assignment
to the punishment. The utility of the behaviour is assessed by the agent
by subtracting the punishment assignment from the behaviour assignment.
The behaviour is changed if the utility becomes too low. In order to achieve
compliance we need agents that can make decisions sensitive to contexts for
which an agent needs to be able to reason about its own values and external
normative demands.
The standard agent architecture for normative behaviour is the BOID
agent (Dignum et al. (2002)), an architecture implementing the interaction
between beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires. The beliefs are the con-
nector to the outside world, they are facts. Obligations are a set of defeasible
rules the agent should follow. Intentions are plans resulting from the inter-
play of the other three ingredients and desires are what the agent wants to
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achieve, its goal. There is a clear distinction between factual and normative
as they are located in distinct compartments of the architecture. This how-
ever means that the interface with the world is here only defined as factual
with the normative obligations being constant or static. As a consequence
there is no feedback between the outside world and the normative part of the
agent architecture. There exists a host of literature starting from Alchourro´n
et al. (1985) how internal external interaction is handled for factual state-
ments. The literature of belief revision is all about how inconsistency is dealt
with and how new knowledge changes the internal belief base. The interest-
ing point about compliance is that there is no immediate change to the belief
base, i.e. the internal belief base is retained whilst external behaviour is
displayed. Change to the internal belief base (which here crucially includes
normative beliefs) can occur gradually through the constant interaction with
the external (normative) world.
There are two modelling approaches we want to discuss as promising
starting points of compliance models. One is recent work on the feedback
between society and individuals by norms captured in the EmiL-project (An-
drighetto et al. (ming) (forthcoming)) the other is work on the learning of
group norms by Verhagen (Verhagen (2001)).
4.1 Emergence in the Loop — EmiL
One of the first agent architectures concerned with norm adaptation and
innovation is the EmiL-A architecture first developed in Andrighetto and
Campenni (2007). The starting point here is a division of agent knowledge
into factual (event) and normative (rule) knowledge. The agent now has a
normative interface with the world rather than just the factual one of the
BOID agent. A simulation of the feedback mechanism between norms and
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agents, building on a simplification of the above architecture is described
in Lotzmann and Mo¨hring (2009a,b) and implemented in Lotzmann et al.
(2008) for the case of pedestrian-driver interaction in traffic situations. The
agents in a simulation have two kinds of memories, an event board, which
stores facts and events and a normative frame there to infer and store rules
from the event board. In addition agents are informed of norms that have
emerged communally by the normative board where this common informa-
tion is stored. The focus here is on how agents understand, learn and change
norms by adaptation and invocation. Lorscheid and Troitzsch (2009) ex-
plore learning concepts for this new kind of information and test them in
a norm invocation model. The authors identify reinforcement learning as
one underlying mechanism but insufficient to model norms. They add nor-
mative learning which is learning from normative invocation messages sent
between agents. The mechanism of norm invocation messages incorporates a
penitance level, a threshold for individual agents at which they change their
behaviour and a social hierarchy, by having authority levels of agents matter
for norm adherence.
In this model agents have a personal value and are confronted with public
values in the form of norm invocations. The penitence level means that agents
do not just conform blindly to public demands but deliberate upon them.
According to the EmiL architecture (EmiL-A), this deliberation results
in behavioural outputs which could take the form of two different kinds of
normative actions, compliance/violation and norm-defence. We think that
compliance as used here differs from our understanding of compliance and
falls within our definition of conformity. This is because while there is a
decision-making process which consists of checking against potential obstacles
(material impossibility and goal conflict) of conforming to a norm or not,
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this takes place providing a norm has been recognised as such and adopted.
At that stage then, the action opted for is either a result of instrumental
reasoning or cooperative/normative disposition rather than situational (and
the norm enters the normative board, an archive in the long-term memory
where active norms are stored and arranged according to their salience, i.e.
degree of activation). EmiL-A, therefore, seems to allow for a form of context-
based reasoning for whether to conform to a norm or not, (see Andrighetto
et al. (ming)), (while EmiL-S (see Lotzmann (2010)) allows for a form of
deliberation comparing the current situation to an earlier one in which the
agent received a norm invocation. The similarity of the current and the
former situations determines the cogency of alternative norms).
Despite the possibility of context sensitive normative behaviour, our un-
derstanding of compliance significantly differs in that it makes normative ac-
tion possible irrespective of whether it is backed up by the normative belief
- normative goal norm adoption process. Rather, the process underpinning
compliance is one of comparison of personal to social beliefs/values in a given
situation, which could result in acting in accordance with but not (necessar-
ily) adopting a norm. Therefore, our understanding of compliance enables
breaking away from the interconnection between belief-decision-behaviour
(and, thus, from the longstanding problem of linking attitude to behaviour)
and focuses on the interconnection between decision and behaviour instead,
thus allowing for the explanation of a wider range of normative behaviours
that exist in human society.
We believe that the different understandings of compliance result from the
line of reasoning underpinning EmiL-A being influenced by a functionalist
approach to norms as functional constituents of social order.
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4.2 Group Norms and Learning
Verhagen (2001) develops a model for the learning of group norms. Agents
are set in a two-dimensional world with two resources, Resource A and Re-
source B. Patches of the world can contain nothing, one of the resources or
both resources. Agents can decide to consume one of the resources, move
to another patch or do nothing. Agents base their decisions on two decision
trees, a personal one and a group one. The personal decision tree is based
on the utility the agent gets from the action. The group decision tree repre-
sents the agents interpretation of the group norms. For an agent’s decision
the trees are combined to one single tree and the action having the com-
bined highest utility is chosen by the agent. Subsequently the agent receives
feedback from the group on its decision resulting in an update of the group
decision tree.
Although we have the two layers of a personal value sphere and the group
norms (as perceived by the agent), this is not a model of compliance.8 The
action decision is not made weighing up the internal values and external de-
mands with behaviour being adapted case by case. The model is a model
of the learning of norms. The agent receiving feedback on its decisions us-
ing the combined decision tree can update what it understands the group
norms to be. It does, however, evaluate the group norms independently of
its own norms, making a decision whether to comply with the group norms
or follow its personal benefit. However, this model, by virtue of having the
public and private sphere of norms and values (or in this case utilities), the
model can serve as a starting point for a model of compliance. What needs
to be adapted is the evaluation of the two decision trees to allow agents to
8Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this model.
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deliberate between them (rather than calculate an overall utility).
4.3 Compliance Model Sketch
What do we need for a model of compliance? We need an agent architecture
that is not only able to reason with norms as is the case in both the EmiL-A
architecture and the Verhagen model of norm learning but an agent architec-
ture that allows the agent to reason about norms. In modelling compliance
the question almost changes from ‘how do agents behave normatively’ to ‘how
do agents violate norms’. The agent has to be able to compare personal val-
ues with normative demands and make a decision in a specific situation. The
Verhagen model has an important underlying formalisation in that it models
private/individual values and public/group values separately but currently
agents do not decide whether to follow one or the other according to a spe-
cific situation but according to how independent an agent is in its thinking
from the group. The EmiL-A architecture has as an important feature the
normative board which allows the learning of norms by interaction with the
outside world and can be the underlying ‘database’ of normative demands
an agent perceives. A model of compliance needs in addition something like
a value board as a database of personal values (morals) and the agent needs
to be able to reason about both boards and their applicability to specific
situations.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
We gave a definition of normative behaviour, using the concept of norma-
tive decision followed by the discussion of a tripartite of kinds of normative
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behaviour extracted from social psychology. Using the triple distinction of
conformity, obedience and compliance, we contend that historic agent-based
models of normative behaviour only formalised conformity and obedience.
We argued that the most interesting adherence to norms, however, is com-
pliance because it is the uniquely human normative behaviour having the
element of deliberation, in contrast to obedience and conformity also being
displayed in animals. We gave some examples of normative modelling which,
in our opinion go beyond the conformity/obedience frameworks but argue
that they do not encapsulate compliance yet. We think that a focus on the
theoretical construct of compliance and an embedding of agent-based models
into social psychology theories of compliance has pointed at what is miss-
ing in the models so far but also points at future developments, such as the
incorporation of intentionality and context sensitivity.
Our analysis falls short on two points. First we have the shortcoming that
automatic responses to internalised norms do not fall under our definition of
normative behaviour. The reason is that we would like to keep normative be-
haviour as deliberate behaviour and automatic responses are not deliberate.
We are thus making a distinction between automatic behaviour, normative
behaviour and behaviour following individual values.
Connected to that problem is the fact that often individual values are
socially determined through norm internalisation, which is often seen as one
of the most important features of normative behaviour, cf. Neumann (2009).
Although a weakness, we think that a focus on a definition of normative
behaviour on deliberative decision making is useful for agent based modelling
as attention will be drawn away from simple calculations, resulting in models
of conformity and obedience.
The reason why automatic behaviour is not covered in our approach is
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that we defined normativity using the motivation of the individual agent for
the behaviour as the demarcation criterion. This can only be done if the
agent makes a decision between individual values and normative behaviour,
i.e. deliberates. One way to extend the definition now is to define all au-
tomatic behaviour as normative behaviour. We think that this definition
will lead into problems as it would let too much behaviour be covered by
the label normative. In addition it would require a separate amendment to
model the dynamics of social influence. We propose that in order to include
automatic behaviour into the analysis of normative behaviour and make our
account dynamic,the vantage point should be located outside the agent and
into the social and situational. This draws on intersubjectivity and rela-
tionality (cf. Garfinkel (1984); Gergen (2009) according to which meaning
is obtained via the interactions and interrelations of agents and is context-
sensitive and situation-specific. This would mean that, a) for non-deliberative
behaviour, whether it is normative or not is decided by the ‘audience’ of the
behaviour and b) that the perception/uptake of an action as normative or
non-normative (besides and beyond the origin of the agent’s own decision)
will feed back into the agent’s consciousness for the next decision. We will
explore the usefullness of this definition extension in future work.
A second shortfall is that our account has no need for normative behaviour
to be rules followed by a population but that behaviour can be normative
on a single instance (the example of friends asking an agent to jump off a
bridge). We would like to make the distinction between individuals behav-
ing normatively and the existence of social norms, the first being a micro-
property, the second a macro property. Our definition is only concerned with
the micro-property of normative behaviour. Social norms are the result of
enough agents displaying the same normative behaviour. Future work is to
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define an agent architecture able of norm compliance as well as conformity
and obedience to investigate the macro phenomenon of social norms.
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